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COMMENT
By Louis H.

I

MAYO

THINK the approach used in Professor Baram's paper was a highly
useful one. It seems that there was a controlled perspective in the
way that Professor Baram looked at a very complex process.
I also thought that the matrix was extremely useful. It looks rather
simplistic but, in fact, it is not. It takes much thought to produce a
research and instructional schedule that can be followed with great
profit. And further, to get anywhere in the field of problem-oriented
analysis, especially within the present university structure, takes a very
vigorous individual. Professor Baram should be congratulated.
Professor Welles covered nearly every point in Professor Baram's
paper, and his comments were so perceptive that I do not care to pursue
that line. We are here to discuss the ways in which science and technology relate to legal education, but if I may, I would speak more broadly
and include all professional education in my comments. I have set out a
number of questions which seem to set boundaries on the vast dimensions of this problem.
One approach to the problem is to look at the traditional decisional
context in which lawyers have operated and at the intellectual tools
and skills that have been used to see how these are matched. We could
ask in what decisional arenas have lawyers performed well? The
next step in this approach is to look at the types of emerging social
problems that exist today and investigate the analytical approaches and
professional skills that are needed to analyze and resolve these problems. Then one could ask whether lawyers are being equipped with the
appropriate concepts and skills to make some progress toward the
resolutions of these problems.
Because we are talking about social problems, this inquiry must
not be limited to lawyers. All professional groups have an input here.
So the question becomes are any professionals presently being equipped
with the appropriate concepts and analytical techniques needed to enable
them to understand, manage, and analyze the kinds of problems with
which we are faced?
Having asked these questions, we should turn to an analysis of
the approach we want to take in technology assessment so as to provide
a framework in which to answer these previous questions. Professor
Baram advocates a preventive approach to social matters; in other words,
one must attempt to avoid the adverse consequences of new technological applications or, for that matter, any other kind of new program
or project introduced into society. This approach puts greater stress
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upon a prospective analysis than upon resolving existing disputes, and
one gets the feeling that technology assessment is offered as a concept
and a method of focusing on an anticipatory approach.
Conceptually, technology assessment might be thought of as a
means of imposing a tolerable degree of control over the direction and
rate of social change. Operationally, however, technology assessment
may be defined as the identification of the effects or changes which
flow from the introduction of a new technological innovation into
society and the evaluation of the social desirability or undesirability of
such effects.
The discussion thus far runs between these two extremes; at one
extreme has been the conceptual - that is, what kinds of notions might
we have of professional education and social problems - and, at the
other extreme, a number of specific examples have been considered.
We should be concerned with how we link a concept of social control
with a new and effective policy which will achieve a net social gain in
the areas with which we are concerned.
In response to this query I would direct your attention to a much
closer look at the operational aspects of technology assessment. I think
that once we have engaged in an analysis of a major, complex technological application being imposed upon the social environment, the
level of discourse, or at least the degree of insight into our discourse,
will change drastically. By looking at the actual operation we will get
a better idea of the kinds of concepts we should form about legal and
professional education.
Now, let us return to Professor Baram's notion of problemorientation and observe that the legal profession has not yet recognized
the full implications of the problem-oriented approach or of stretching
traditional concepts and techniques of decisionmaking far beyond that
which is absorbed through exposure to judicial thinking in case after
case. The legal approach, as we know, emphasizes deductive reasoning
from given principles or premises rather than alternative thinking about
desired social goals and the satisfactory means of achieving such goals.
This judgment may be a bit unfair to some law schools, since numerous
legal scholars have been emphasizing the need for problem, policy, and
alternative thinking for years, but on the other hand, the continuing
push toward specialization must inevitably have the effect of constructing total social problem conceptualization. One has but to scan the list of
areas of interest which appeared on a recent questionnaire sent to the
members of the American Bar Association to see this narrowness; nor
does the situation appear any more encouraging when one reviews the
list of law books recommended for libraries which was recently published by the Association of American Law Schools.
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What this means is that the legal profession, including legal education, is not placing sufficient emphasis on structured approaches to
decisionmaking nor to institutional innovation. There is too much
emphasis on subject areas rather than on the process of legal policy
decisionmaking. Further, to the extent that process or function is treated,
such treatment is usually limited to the conventional, nonoperational
categories of the adjudicatory, legislative, executive, or regulatory
functions, rather than focusing on the actual phases of the combined
policy formulation and program implementation process.
We need an approach that will provide for: (1) perception of
the problem; (2) formulation and definition of the problem and its
context; (3) the assembling of relevant information; (4) consideration
of alternative means such as statutory schemes, organizational arrangements, and social action programs; (5) evaluation and recommendation
or promotion of selected outcomes; (6) formal prescriptions for new
law or for the operation of new programs; (7) application of new
statutory schemes in appropriate decisional contexts or the implementation of the prescribed social action program in a similar context; and
(8) appraisal of the effects of the application of the statutory scheme
or social action program based on continued monitoring and appraisal.
Now I would like to turn to the various operations that seem to
be involved in technology assessment. Assessment tasks differ considerably depending upon many factors which effect the study parameter
such as the sponsoring agency or the initiating entity, the nature of a
particular application, or the resources of the assessing entity. Hence,
we can anticipate a variety of assessment methodologies.
If we assume for the present that there is a major, new technological
application that is being proposed for introduction into the future social
environment, then it appears that the following types of organizational
and analytical operations are essential. In the preparatory phase, a time
sequence should be specified in order to achieve the objective of the
assessment. The next step would be provisional organization of assessment staff and the social impact test units related to social subsystems.
Examples of such subsystems include effective public decision processes,
economic institutions and processes, knowledge and skill institutions
and processes, urban and regional development processes, social behavioral patterns, standards of conduct, interpersonal relations, processes
for exercising rational options in the social environment, access to goods
and services, and processes affecting the quality of the natural environment. The assembled staff must then be instructed in the overall
methodology of the study and the techniques for the evaluation of
social impacts.
During the execution phase, when actually performing the assessment, the following operations must be performed: base line data on
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the existing social environment must be established; base line data on
the development and research stages of the relevant technology must
be established; projections of alternative future social environments
within the prescribed time frame; deliberate interventions and contingencies must be taken into account; the proposed technological
application must be imposed on the projected future social environment;
the significant effects or changes which will necessarily or possibly
occur during the initiation, implementation, and operational stages
of the technology application must be identified; those effects which
will be fully analyzed and evaluated to determine the social impacts
of the application must be selected; the participants, institutions,
processes, and social interests affected by the changes brought about
by the introduction of the application in the future social environment
must be identified; there must be social impact analysis of such effects
in terms of their probability, magnitude, duration, or social desirability
or undesirability; the social impacts must be measured in such a manner
as to provide useful inputs into a rational decisional process; and the
assessment outcome must be presented in terms of an overall social costbenefit ratio, or by an analysis of critical policy issues.
The one thing that is apparent from such a problem-oriented
approach or operational analysis of technology assessment is that social
problems are damned complex creatures; they are not solved by looking
at any fixed set - legal, economic, or sociological - and certainly not
just by technology. This we clearly should be able to derive from our
consideration of the technology assessment, problem-context analysis. By
deliberately pursuing some representative policy analyses or technology
assessments in terms of the particular operations noted above, we can
identify the types of concepts and analytical skills which are required
for effective performance. This in turn provides the professional schools
with guidelines for curricular development if we are to equip our future
graduates adequately for dealing with the problems of an increasingly
complex society.

